国家安全监管总局办公厅关于危险化学品安全监管有关问题的复函
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国家安全监管总局办公厅关于危险化学品安全监管有关问题的复函
国家安全监管总局办公厅关于危险化学品安全监管有关问题的复函
安监总厅管三函〔2013〕65号
吉林省安全生产监督管理局：
你局《关于危险化学品安全监管有关问题的请示》（吉安监管审批〔2013〕60号）收悉。经研究，现函复如下：
一、危险化学品建设项目的规划、布局、选址、建设应当符合《危险化学品安全管理条例》（国务院令第591号）第十一条、第十二条的规定，有关安全条件论证报告应当符合《危险化学品建设项目安全监督管理办法》（国家安全监管总局令第45号）第八条的规定。天然气长输管道的分输站或末站建设项目纳入天然气长输管道建设项目安全监管范围，钢铁企业配套建设的氧气生产企业纳入钢铁企业的安全监管范围。
二、依据《危险化学品生产企业安全生产许可证实施办法》（国家安全监管总局令第41号）第四条的规定，危险化学品生产企业所属危险化学品生产装置的日常生产、安全管理等实行委托管理的，应当由危险化学品生产装置的权属企业提出安全生产许可证的申请，具有许可权限的安全生产监督管理部门依法予以审批。
三、《汽车加油加气站设计与施工规范》（GB50156-2012）自2013年3月1日起实施，适用于新建、扩建和改建的汽车加油站工程的设计和施工。
国家安全监管总局办公厅
2013年5月3日
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Chapter IV
Function of Panels: Art. 11 of the DSU
OUTLINE
I Introduction
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
IV Allegation against Panels’ Standard of Review
V Exercise of Judicial Economy
I Introduction
The function of panels is expressly defined in Art. 11 of the DSU, which reads as follows:
“The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.”
This provision suggests that the function of panels is to make an objective assessment such as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. However, how do panels fulfill their functions as provided in Art. 11 of the DSU? It is the issue that we will touch on in this chapter. In this chapter, the author explores on the standard of review issue under the WTO, i.e. “an objective assessment”; as well as on the exercised judicial economy principle developed in panel’s review.
With regard to the standard of review issue, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures have increasingly confronted questions concerning the degree to which an international body, under the GATT/WTO, should “second guess” a decision of a national government agency concerning economic regulations that are allegedly inconsistent with an international rule. It seems clear that the international agreement doesn’t permit a national government’s determination always to prevail, otherwise the international rules could be easily evaded or rendered ineffective. But should the international body approach the issues involved without any deference to the national government? It has been argued in the GATT/WTO proceedings that panels should respect national government determinations, up to some point. That “point” is the crucial issue that has sometimes been labelled the “standard of review”.1
Of course, this issue is not unique to the GATT/WTO. Naturally, the standard-of-review issue is one that many legal systems face. “The standard-of-review question is faced at least implicitly whenever sovereign members of a treaty yield interpretive and dispute settlement powers to international panels and tribunals. Moreover, as national economies become increasingly interdependent, and as the need for international cooperation and coordination accordingly becomes greater, the standard-of-review question will become increasingly important.” 2 And “it can be seen that the standard-of-review question is a recurring and delicate one, and one that to some extent goes to the core of an international procedure that must (in a rule-based system) assess a national government’s actions against treaty or other international norms”. 3
However, for the immediate purpose, we want to focus below on the more particular question of the proper standard of review for a WTO panel when it undertakes to examine a national government’s actions or rulings that engage the question of consistency with the various WTO agreements and are subject to the DSU procedures.
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
Under the WTO jurisprudence, it’s demonstrated that Art. 11 of the DSU has been applied as a general standard of review. Art. 11 suggests that the function of panels is to make “an objective assessment” so as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
For example, in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), the Panel rules that, “although the DSU does not contain any specific reference to standards of review, we consider that Article 11 of the DSU which describes the parameters of the function of panels, is relevant here”. 4
And the application of Art. 11 as a general standard of review under the DSU is analyzed systematically in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48) where the Appellate Body rules that: 5
“The first point that must be made in this connection, is that the SPS Agreement itself is silent on the matter of an appropriate standard of review for panels deciding upon SPS measures of a Member. Nor are there provisions in the DSU or any of the covered agreements (other than the Anti-Dumping Agreement) prescribing a particular standard of review. Only Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has language on the standard of review to be employed by panels engaged in the ‘assessment of the facts of the matter’. We find no indication in the SPS Agreement of an intent on the part of the Members to adopt or incorporate into that Agreement the standard set out in Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Textually, Article 17.6(i) is specific to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
[…]
We do not mean, however, to suggest that there is at present no standard of review applicable to the determination and assessment of the facts in proceedings under the SPS Agreement or under other covered agreements. In our view, Article 11 of the DSU bears directly on this matter and, in effect, articulates with great succinctness but with sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of review for panels in respect of both the ascertainment of facts and the legal characterization of such facts under the relevant agreements […]”
In sum, for all but one of the covered agreements, Art. 11 of the DSU sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels. As stated on more than one occasion, Art. 11 of the DSU, and, in particular, its requirement that “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”, sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels examining the consistency or inconsistency of alleged measures under the WTO jurisprudence. And the only exception is the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in which a specific provision, Art. 17.6, sets out a special standard of review for disputes arising under that Agreement（to be discussed in subsequent chapter）.6
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
In EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), in the view of the European Communities, “the principal alternative approaches to the problem of formulating the ‘proper standard of review’ so far as panels are concerned are two-fold. The first is designated as ‘de novo review’. This standard of review would allow a panel complete freedom to come to a different view than the competent authority of the Member whose act or determination is being reviewed. A panel would have to ‘verify whether the determination by the national authority was…correct (both factually and procedurally)’. The second is described as ‘deference’. Under a ‘deference’ standard, a panel, in the submission of the European Communities, should not seek to redo the investigation conducted by the national authority but instead examine whether the ‘procedure’ required by the relevant WTO rules had been followed”.7 In this respect, the Appellate Body rules that:8
“So far as fact-finding by panels is concerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate of Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor ‘total deference’, but rather the ‘objective assessment of the facts’. Many panels have in the past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review. On the other hand, ‘total deference to the findings of the national authorities’, it has been well said, ‘could not ensure an 'objective assessment' as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU’.”
The ruling is confirmed on many other occasions. For example, the Panel on US-Underwear (DS24) finds that: 9
“In our opinion, a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue, and most notably in the panel report on the ‘Transformers’ case.
The panel in the ‘Transformers’ case was confronted with the argument of New Zealand that the determination of ‘material injury’ by the competent New Zealand investigating authority could not be scrutinized by the panel. The ‘Transformers’ panel responded to this argument as follows:
‘The Panel agreed that the responsibility to make a determination of material injury caused by dumped imports rested in the first place with the authorities of the importing contracting party concerned. However, the Panel could not share the view that such a determination could not be scrutinized if it were challenged by another contracting party. On the contrary, the Panel believed that if a contracting party affected by the determination could make a case that the importation could not in itself have the effect of causing material injury to the industry in question, that contracting party was entitled, under the relevant GATT provisions and in particular Article XXIII, that its representations be given sympathetic consideration and that eventually, if no satisfactory adjustment was effected, it might refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, as had been done by Finland in the present case. To conclude otherwise would give governments complete freedom and unrestricted discretion in deciding anti-dumping cases without any possibility to review the action taken in the GATT. This would lead to an unacceptable situation under the aspect of law and order in international trade relations as governed by the GATT’.”
In short, for the panel to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an “objective assessment” as foreseen by Art. 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue. However, panels do not see their review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities, either. For example, in Argentina-Footwear (DS121), the Panel doesn’t consider that they have the mandate to conduct a de novo review: 10
“This approach is consistent with the reports of panels reviewing national investigations… The panel on United States - Anti-dumping Duties on Import of Salmon from Norway concluded that it should not engage in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national investigating authority.
The panel on United States - Underwear followed this approach by noting, however, that it did not see its ‘review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities or by the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). Rather…the Panel's function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this case the CITA. We draw particular attention to the fact that a series of panel reports in the anti-dumping and subsidies/countervailing duties context have made it clear that it is not the role of panels to engage in a de novo review. In our view, the same is true for panels operating in the context of the ATC, since they would be called upon, as in the cases dealing with anti-dumping and/or subsidies/countervailing duties, to review the consistency of a determination by a national investigating authority imposing a restriction under the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO legal instruments, in this case the ATC. …’
Accordingly, the panel on United States - Underwear decided, ‘in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, to make an objective assessment of the Statement issued by the US authorities … which, as the parties to the dispute agreed, constitutes the scope of the matter properly before the Panel without, however, engaging in a de novo review. … an objective assessment would entail an examination of whether the CITA had examined all relevant facts before it, whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was consistent with the international obligations of the United States’.
The panel on United States - Shirts and Blouses also stated that ‘[t]his is not to say that the Panel interprets the ATC as imposing on the importing Member any specific method either for collecting data or for considering and weighing all the relevant economic factors upon which the importing Member will decide whether there is need for a safeguard restraint. The relative importance of particular factors including those listed in Article 6.3 of the ATC is for each Member to assess in the light of the circumstances of each case’.
These past GATT and WTO panel reports make it clear that panels examining national investigations in the context of the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well as safeguards under the ATC, have refrained from engaging in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national authority.”
However, as emphasized by the Appellate Body, although panels are not entitled to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities, this does not mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. In this respect, the phrase “de novo review” should not be used loosely. If a panel concludes that the competent authorities, in a particular case, have not provided a reasoned or adequate explanation for their determination, that panel has not, thereby, engaged in a de novo review. Nor has that panel substituted its own conclusions for those of the competent authorities. Rather, the panel has, consistent with its obligations under the DSU, simply reached a conclusion that the determination made by the competent authorities is inconsistent with the specific requirements of the covered Agreement. 11
国家旅游局
关于认真做好旅游业恢复期间“非典”防控、安全防范和市场规范工作指导意见的通知
各省、自治区、直辖市旅游局（委）：
在党中央、国务院的坚强领导下，全国人民万众一心，众志成城，抗击“非典”，已经取得了决定性成果。当前，全国旅游行业正按照“两手抓”的方针和国家旅游局《关于6月份及今后一个时期全国旅游工作总体部署意见的通知》〔旅发（2003）41号〕精神，积极启动旅游业复苏工作。为了保障今后一个时期我国旅游业恢复、发展和振兴工作顺利进展，现就认真做好旅游业恢复期间“非典”防控、安全防范和市场规范工作提出如下指导意见：
一、指导思想和目标
全行业要以“三个代表”重要思想为指导，坚决贯彻党中央、国务院提出的“两手抓”的方针，充分认识在当前阶段切实做好“非典”防控、安全防范和市场规范工作的重要性和迫切性，以对海内外旅游者高度负责的态度，再接再厉抓“非典”防控，全力以赴抓安全秩序。努力做到在旅游业逐步恢复发展的同时，积极保障旅游者健康安全，严防“非典”通过旅游活动传播，实现旅游市场“健康、安全、秩序、质量”四统一。
二、抓住重点环节，确保旅游恢复工作安全健康有序
（一）狠抓“非典”防控和安全防范不放松。各地要充分认识抓“非典”防控和旅游安全工作的长期性、艰巨性、复杂性和反复性，坚决克服麻痹和松懈情绪，切实做好旅游健康保障和安全防范工作。各类旅游经营单位要进一步巩固和加强“非典”防控工作的组织领导机制，落实各项责任制，做到没有发生疫情防范工作不松懈，一旦发生疫情后防控工作及时到位。要认真贯彻执行国家旅游局最近将发布施行的《旅游服务健康安全工作基本要求》，并结合本单位的实际和恢复旅游活动中出现的新情况，进一步充实和完善相关内容，增强工作的预见性和主动性。要抓住机遇，强化健康文明旅游的宣传，扫除旅游活动中一部分人存在的不健康、不文明的陋习，积极引导讲文明、讲卫生、讲科学、保健康的旅游行为，创造更加健康文明的旅游公共卫生环境。
安全是旅游的生命线，没有安全就没有旅游。各级旅游局在抓好“非典”防控工作的同时，要切实加强对旅游安全工作的检查、指导和监督。要严格按照《安全生产法》等法律、法规，加强旅游安全责任制，落实有关措施，增强旅游从业人员的安全工作意识，防范旅游交通、食宿、游览等各个环节上旅游安全事故的发生。要争取相关部门和当地政府的支持，逐步建立起以城市为中心的旅游突发公共卫生事件和重大安全事故的应急处理机制。
（二）加强协作，确保旅行团行程畅通。各地疫情不同，启动恢复旅游市场在时间和步骤上存在一些差异。特别是在局部恢复旅游，同时世界卫生组织尚未宣布“两解除”期间，可能出现跨地区海外旅行团行程不畅的问题，各地要认真做好协调工作。在世界卫生组织宣布“两解除”后，各地都要按照统一大市场的原则，相互支持，协调行动，杜绝行程不畅问题的发生。全面恢复旅游后，如有“非典”疫情出现，必须及时报告并采取相应措施。
在旅游恢复期间，旅行社在与游客签定合同时，应明确“旅行中一旦出现疫情，游客要积极配合，接受监管保护，并接受对行程的合理调整”等内容。
（三）防止旅游市场价格混乱。在旅游业恢复发展初期，为激活旅游市场开展一些优惠价格促销活动是必要的，但必须划清优惠促销与削价竞争的界限，做到优质优价，质价相符，反对低于成本价的恶意削价。要充分发挥各类协会的自律作用，组织旅行社、饭店和景点等骨干企业达成共识，共同约定和遵守合理的市场价格，形成整体的价格促销策略，并向社会公开，接受舆论和行风评议部门的监督，共同抵制少数企业恶意削价行为。要积极开展对游客的理性消费宣传教育，引导旅游消费向追求质量的方向发展。要联合工商、物价等部门，加强对旅游市场价格的检查执法力度，查处违法违规行为。
（四）高度重视服务质量。各地要把向海内外旅游者提供优质规范服务作为“非典”过后我国旅游业恢复、发展和振兴中的一项重要举措来抓，切实抓紧抓好。要针对前段时期许多旅游企业处于歇业状态、员工离岗或休假的实际，尽快抓好硬件恢复运转、设备检修保养、员工开展培训等工作。针对后“非典”时期游客更加重视安全和健康的心理以及随之引起的出游方式和形式的变化，及时调整旅游产品、完善服务内容和产品种类，大力推广符合健康安全标准的个性化服务，树立“非典”后旅游服务的新形象。
（五）防止新的拖欠款发生。 受“非典”影响，旅游企业遭受重大损失，目前普遍存在着资金周转困难的问题。旅游经营活动重新开始后，企业之间的资金往来能否作到重承诺、讲信用，认真履行合同，关系到整个旅游市场能否健康恢复。各级旅游管理部门要在积极帮助困难企业落实各级政府出台的有关扶持政策的同时，督导各类旅游企业开展诚信经营，防止新的拖欠款发生。要坚决禁止各个旅行社以任何借口和名义向导游收取押金、垫付团费和收取人头费等违规行为。对不按上述要求办理的问题严重的企业，要坚决依法查处。
（六）加强旅游投诉处理工作。“非典”发生后，由于暂时终止了旅游业务，引发了一些旅游纠纷，各地旅游质监部门已经协调处理了一些游客投诉。旅游市场逐步恢复后，由于各种因素的影响，可能还会引发一些新的纠纷。各级旅游质监部门要加强投诉处理工作的力度，及时受理和处理游客投诉。对因“非典”影响而直接造成行程中断而引发的纠纷，要本着协作、诚信和公正的原则进行慎重调解，尽量化解矛盾。
三、抓好基础工作，为旅游业的全面恢复创造优良环境
（一）维护旅游市场秩序，打击各种违法违规行为。要充分估计到一些黑社、黑导、黑车在旅游恢复期会进行各种非法经营活动。各级旅游管理部门要结合本地实际，制定工作预案，适时组织开展专项打击。要继续按照2002年全国旅游市场打假打非专项整治工作的要求，以旅游城市为依托，部门协作，密切配合，协同作战，集中时间和力量，重点整治影响本地旅游市场秩序的突出问题，严厉打击黑社、黑导、黑车等违法经营行为，认真查处旅行社以虚假广告招徕游客及导游私拿回扣等不正之风。
（二）加强导游队伍建设，继续推进IC卡网络管理。“非典”期间，各地对社会导游员的管理出现空档，随着旅游市场的恢复，一批社会导游员又将受聘上团。为保证导游服务质量，各级旅游管理部门要按照2002年治理整顿旅游市场秩序时提出的社会导游管理办法，立即对本地导游管理公司进行一次全面检查，继续推进各项改革措施，完善各项管理制度。导游管理公司要集中时间对所辖社会导游人员进行一次业务培训和防控“非典”的知识培训，使所有社会导游员能符合带团的业务要求，并熟练掌握防控“非典”的各项应急预案的要求。已经完成导游IC卡管理设备安装和调试的地区，要按照国家旅游局年初提出的工作计划，及时开展导游IC卡联网检查，并按时传送检查信息。“十一”前后，国家旅游局将抽查各地开展导游IC卡检查工作的情况。
（三）加快改革步伐，完善旅游企业经营体制和内部管理机制。要深入研究“非典”对旅游活动深层次的影响，特别是由此而暴露出的旅游企业经营体制和内部管理机制不健全、抵抗风险能力差等问题。要鼓励在市场导向下的企业重组，实现旅游企业经营、投资和产权的多元化、网络化和企业内部经营管理的科学化，向做大做强发展。要积极引进国际上有信誉、有实力的旅行社来华建立控股或独资旅行社。要积极探索建立更加完整的旅游保险体系，为企业发展和规避风险创造有利条件。
请各省区市旅游局按照本《通知》的精神，紧密结合本地实际，认真抓好贯彻落实工作，为全国夺取抗击“非典”的最后胜利和为各地区旅游业的尽快恢复发展做出更大贡献。
特此通知。
国家旅游局
二○○三年六月十八日
Function of Panels: Art. 11 of the DSU
OUTLINE
I Introduction
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
IV Allegation against Panels’ Standard of Review
V Exercise of Judicial Economy
I Introduction
The function of panels is expressly defined in Art. 11 of the DSU, which reads as follows:
“The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.”
This provision suggests that the function of panels is to make an objective assessment such as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. However, how do panels fulfill their functions as provided in Art. 11 of the DSU? It is the issue that we will touch on in this chapter. In this chapter, the author explores on the standard of review issue under the WTO, i.e. “an objective assessment”; as well as on the exercised judicial economy principle developed in panel’s review.
With regard to the standard of review issue, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures have increasingly confronted questions concerning the degree to which an international body, under the GATT/WTO, should “second guess” a decision of a national government agency concerning economic regulations that are allegedly inconsistent with an international rule. It seems clear that the international agreement doesn’t permit a national government’s determination always to prevail, otherwise the international rules could be easily evaded or rendered ineffective. But should the international body approach the issues involved without any deference to the national government? It has been argued in the GATT/WTO proceedings that panels should respect national government determinations, up to some point. That “point” is the crucial issue that has sometimes been labelled the “standard of review”.1
Of course, this issue is not unique to the GATT/WTO. Naturally, the standard-of-review issue is one that many legal systems face. “The standard-of-review question is faced at least implicitly whenever sovereign members of a treaty yield interpretive and dispute settlement powers to international panels and tribunals. Moreover, as national economies become increasingly interdependent, and as the need for international cooperation and coordination accordingly becomes greater, the standard-of-review question will become increasingly important.” 2 And “it can be seen that the standard-of-review question is a recurring and delicate one, and one that to some extent goes to the core of an international procedure that must (in a rule-based system) assess a national government’s actions against treaty or other international norms”. 3
However, for the immediate purpose, we want to focus below on the more particular question of the proper standard of review for a WTO panel when it undertakes to examine a national government’s actions or rulings that engage the question of consistency with the various WTO agreements and are subject to the DSU procedures.
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
Under the WTO jurisprudence, it’s demonstrated that Art. 11 of the DSU has been applied as a general standard of review. Art. 11 suggests that the function of panels is to make “an objective assessment” so as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
For example, in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), the Panel rules that, “although the DSU does not contain any specific reference to standards of review, we consider that Article 11 of the DSU which describes the parameters of the function of panels, is relevant here”. 4
And the application of Art. 11 as a general standard of review under the DSU is analyzed systematically in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48) where the Appellate Body rules that: 5
“The first point that must be made in this connection, is that the SPS Agreement itself is silent on the matter of an appropriate standard of review for panels deciding upon SPS measures of a Member. Nor are there provisions in the DSU or any of the covered agreements (other than the Anti-Dumping Agreement) prescribing a particular standard of review. Only Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has language on the standard of review to be employed by panels engaged in the ‘assessment of the facts of the matter’. We find no indication in the SPS Agreement of an intent on the part of the Members to adopt or incorporate into that Agreement the standard set out in Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Textually, Article 17.6(i) is specific to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
[…]
We do not mean, however, to suggest that there is at present no standard of review applicable to the determination and assessment of the facts in proceedings under the SPS Agreement or under other covered agreements. In our view, Article 11 of the DSU bears directly on this matter and, in effect, articulates with great succinctness but with sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of review for panels in respect of both the ascertainment of facts and the legal characterization of such facts under the relevant agreements […]”
In sum, for all but one of the covered agreements, Art. 11 of the DSU sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels. As stated on more than one occasion, Art. 11 of the DSU, and, in particular, its requirement that “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”, sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels examining the consistency or inconsistency of alleged measures under the WTO jurisprudence. And the only exception is the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in which a specific provision, Art. 17.6, sets out a special standard of review for disputes arising under that Agreement（to be discussed in subsequent chapter）.6
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
In EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), in the view of the European Communities, “the principal alternative approaches to the problem of formulating the ‘proper standard of review’ so far as panels are concerned are two-fold. The first is designated as ‘de novo review’. This standard of review would allow a panel complete freedom to come to a different view than the competent authority of the Member whose act or determination is being reviewed. A panel would have to ‘verify whether the determination by the national authority was…correct (both factually and procedurally)’. The second is described as ‘deference’. Under a ‘deference’ standard, a panel, in the submission of the European Communities, should not seek to redo the investigation conducted by the national authority but instead examine whether the ‘procedure’ required by the relevant WTO rules had been followed”.7 In this respect, the Appellate Body rules that:8
“So far as fact-finding by panels is concerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate of Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor ‘total deference’, but rather the ‘objective assessment of the facts’. Many panels have in the past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review. On the other hand, ‘total deference to the findings of the national authorities’, it has been well said, ‘could not ensure an 'objective assessment' as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU’.”
The ruling is confirmed on many other occasions. For example, the Panel on US-Underwear (DS24) finds that: 9
“In our opinion, a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue, and most notably in the panel report on the ‘Transformers’ case.
The panel in the ‘Transformers’ case was confronted with the argument of New Zealand that the determination of ‘material injury’ by the competent New Zealand investigating authority could not be scrutinized by the panel. The ‘Transformers’ panel responded to this argument as follows:
‘The Panel agreed that the responsibility to make a determination of material injury caused by dumped imports rested in the first place with the authorities of the importing contracting party concerned. However, the Panel could not share the view that such a determination could not be scrutinized if it were challenged by another contracting party. On the contrary, the Panel believed that if a contracting party affected by the determination could make a case that the importation could not in itself have the effect of causing material injury to the industry in question, that contracting party was entitled, under the relevant GATT provisions and in particular Article XXIII, that its representations be given sympathetic consideration and that eventually, if no satisfactory adjustment was effected, it might refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, as had been done by Finland in the present case. To conclude otherwise would give governments complete freedom and unrestricted discretion in deciding anti-dumping cases without any possibility to review the action taken in the GATT. This would lead to an unacceptable situation under the aspect of law and order in international trade relations as governed by the GATT’.”
In short, for the panel to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an “objective assessment” as foreseen by Art. 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue. However, panels do not see their review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities, either. For example, in Argentina-Footwear (DS121), the Panel doesn’t consider that they have the mandate to conduct a de novo review: 10
“This approach is consistent with the reports of panels reviewing national investigations… The panel on United States - Anti-dumping Duties on Import of Salmon from Norway concluded that it should not engage in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national investigating authority.
The panel on United States - Underwear followed this approach by noting, however, that it did not see its ‘review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities or by the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). Rather…the Panel's function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this case the CITA. We draw particular attention to the fact that a series of panel reports in the anti-dumping and subsidies/countervailing duties context have made it clear that it is not the role of panels to engage in a de novo review. In our view, the same is true for panels operating in the context of the ATC, since they would be called upon, as in the cases dealing with anti-dumping and/or subsidies/countervailing duties, to review the consistency of a determination by a national investigating authority imposing a restriction under the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO legal instruments, in this case the ATC. …’
Accordingly, the panel on United States - Underwear decided, ‘in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, to make an objective assessment of the Statement issued by the US authorities … which, as the parties to the dispute agreed, constitutes the scope of the matter properly before the Panel without, however, engaging in a de novo review. … an objective assessment would entail an examination of whether the CITA had examined all relevant facts before it, whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was consistent with the international obligations of the United States’.
The panel on United States - Shirts and Blouses also stated that ‘[t]his is not to say that the Panel interprets the ATC as imposing on the importing Member any specific method either for collecting data or for considering and weighing all the relevant economic factors upon which the importing Member will decide whether there is need for a safeguard restraint. The relative importance of particular factors including those listed in Article 6.3 of the ATC is for each Member to assess in the light of the circumstances of each case’.
These past GATT and WTO panel reports make it clear that panels examining national investigations in the context of the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well as safeguards under the ATC, have refrained from engaging in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national authority.”
However, as emphasized by the Appellate Body, although panels are not entitled to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities, this does not mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. In this respect, the phrase “de novo review” should not be used loosely. If a panel concludes that the competent authorities, in a particular case, have not provided a reasoned or adequate explanation for their determination, that panel has not, thereby, engaged in a de novo review. Nor has that panel substituted its own conclusions for those of the competent authorities. Rather, the panel has, consistent with its obligations under the DSU, simply reached a conclusion that the determination made by the competent authorities is inconsistent with the specific requirements of the covered Agreement. 11
关于认真做好旅游业恢复期间“非典”防控、安全防范和市场规范工作指导意见的通知
关于认真做好旅游业恢复期间“非典”防控、安全防范和市场规范工作指导意见的通知
各省、自治区、直辖市旅游局（委）：
在党中央、国务院的坚强领导下，全国人民万众一心，众志成城，抗击“非典”，已经取得了决定性成果。当前，全国旅游行业正按照“两手抓”的方针和国家旅游局《关于6月份及今后一个时期全国旅游工作总体部署意见的通知》〔旅发（2003）41号〕精神，积极启动旅游业复苏工作。为了保障今后一个时期我国旅游业恢复、发展和振兴工作顺利进展，现就认真做好旅游业恢复期间“非典”防控、安全防范和市场规范工作提出如下指导意见：
一、指导思想和目标
全行业要以“三个代表”重要思想为指导，坚决贯彻党中央、国务院提出的“两手抓”的方针，充分认识在当前阶段切实做好“非典”防控、安全防范和市场规范工作的重要性和迫切性，以对海内外旅游者高度负责的态度，再接再厉抓“非典”防控，全力以赴抓安全秩序。努力做到在旅游业逐步恢复发展的同时，积极保障旅游者健康安全，严防“非典”通过旅游活动传播，实现旅游市场“健康、安全、秩序、质量”四统一。
二、抓住重点环节，确保旅游恢复工作安全健康有序
（一）狠抓“非典”防控和安全防范不放松。各地要充分认识抓“非典”防控和旅游安全工作的长期性、艰巨性、复杂性和反复性，坚决克服麻痹和松懈情绪，切实做好旅游健康保障和安全防范工作。各类旅游经营单位要进一步巩固和加强“非典”防控工作的组织领导机制，落实各项责任制，做到没有发生疫情防范工作不松懈，一旦发生疫情后防控工作及时到位。要认真贯彻执行国家旅游局最近将发布施行的《旅游服务健康安全工作基本要求》，并结合本单位的实际和恢复旅游活动中出现的新情况，进一步充实和完善相关内容，增强工作的预见性和主动性。要抓住机遇，强化健康文明旅游的宣传，扫除旅游活动中一部分人存在的不健康、不文明的陋习，积极引导讲文明、讲卫生、讲科学、保健康的旅游行为，创造更加健康文明的旅游公共卫生环境。
安全是旅游的生命线，没有安全就没有旅游。各级旅游局在抓好“非典”防控工作的同时，要切实加强对旅游安全工作的检查、指导和监督。要严格按照《安全生产法》等法律、法规，加强旅游安全责任制，落实有关措施，增强旅游从业人员的安全工作意识，防范旅游交通、食宿、游览等各个环节上旅游安全事故的发生。要争取相关部门和当地政府的支持，逐步建立起以城市为中心的旅游突发公共卫生事件和重大安全事故的应急处理机制。
（二）加强协作，确保旅行团行程畅通。各地疫情不同，启动恢复旅游市场在时间和步骤上存在一些差异。特别是在局部恢复旅游，同时世界卫生组织尚未宣布“两解除”期间，可能出现跨地区海外旅行团行程不畅的问题，各地要认真做好协调工作。在世界卫生组织宣布“两解除”后，各地都要按照统一大市场的原则，相互支持，协调行动，杜绝行程不畅问题的发生。全面恢复旅游后，如有“非典”疫情出现，必须及时报告并采取相应措施。
在旅游恢复期间，旅行社在与游客签定合同时，应明确“旅行中一旦出现疫情，游客要积极配合，接受监管保护，并接受对行程的合理调整”等内容。
（三）防止旅游市场价格混乱。在旅游业恢复发展初期，为激活旅游市场开展一些优惠价格促销活动是必要的，但必须划清优惠促销与削价竞争的界限，做到优质优价，质价相符，反对低于成本价的恶意削价。要充分发挥各类协会的自律作用，组织旅行社、饭店和景点等骨干企业达成共识，共同约定和遵守合理的市场价格，形成整体的价格促销策略，并向社会公开，接受舆论和行风评议部门的监督，共同抵制少数企业恶意削价行为。要积极开展对游客的理性消费宣传教育，引导旅游消费向追求质量的方向发展。要联合工商、物价等部门，加强对旅游市场价格的检查执法力度，查处违法违规行为。
（四）高度重视服务质量。各地要把向海内外旅游者提供优质规范服务作为“非典”过后我国旅游业恢复、发展和振兴中的一项重要举措来抓，切实抓紧抓好。要针对前段时期许多旅游企业处于歇业状态、员工离岗或休假的实际，尽快抓好硬件恢复运转、设备检修保养、员工开展培训等工作。针对后“非典”时期游客更加重视安全和健康的心理以及随之引起的出游方式和形式的变化，及时调整旅游产品、完善服务内容和产品种类，大力推广符合健康安全标准的个性化服务，树立“非典”后旅游服务的新形象。
（五）防止新的拖欠款发生。 受“非典”影响，旅游企业遭受重大损失，目前普遍存在着资金周转困难的问题。旅游经营活动重新开始后，企业之间的资金往来能否作到重承诺、讲信用，认真履行合同，关系到整个旅游市场能否健康恢复。各级旅游管理部门要在积极帮助困难企业落实各级政府出台的有关扶持政策的同时，督导各类旅游企业开展诚信经营，防止新的拖欠款发生。要坚决禁止各个旅行社以任何借口和名义向导游收取押金、垫付团费和收取人头费等违规行为。对不按上述要求办理的问题严重的企业，要坚决依法查处。
（六）加强旅游投诉处理工作。“非典”发生后，由于暂时终止了旅游业务，引发了一些旅游纠纷，各地旅游质监部门已经协调处理了一些游客投诉。旅游市场逐步恢复后，由于各种因素的影响，可能还会引发一些新的纠纷。各级旅游质监部门要加强投诉处理工作的力度，及时受理和处理游客投诉。对因“非典”影响而直接造成行程中断而引发的纠纷，要本着协作、诚信和公正的原则进行慎重调解，尽量化解矛盾。
三、抓好基础工作，为旅游业的全面恢复创造优良环境
（一）维护旅游市场秩序，打击各种违法违规行为。要充分估计到一些黑社、黑导、黑车在旅游恢复期会进行各种非法经营活动。各级旅游管理部门要结合本地实际，制定工作预案，适时组织开展专项打击。要继续按照2002年全国旅游市场打假打非专项整治工作的要求，以旅游城市为依托，部门协作，密切配合，协同作战，集中时间和力量，重点整治影响本地旅游市场秩序的突出问题，严厉打击黑社、黑导、黑车等违法经营行为，认真查处旅行社以虚假广告招徕游客及导游私拿回扣等不正之风。
（二）加强导游队伍建设，继续推进IC卡网络管理。“非典”期间，各地对社会导游员的管理出现空档，随着旅游市场的恢复，一批社会导游员又将受聘上团。为保证导游服务质量，各级旅游管理部门要按照2002年治理整顿旅游市场秩序时提出的社会导游管理办法，立即对本地导游管理公司进行一次全面检查，继续推进各项改革措施，完善各项管理制度。导游管理公司要集中时间对所辖社会导游人员进行一次业务培训和防控“非典”的知识培训，使所有社会导游员能符合带团的业务要求，并熟练掌握防控“非典”的各项应急预案的要求。已经完成导游IC卡管理设备安装和调试的地区，要按照国家旅游局年初提出的工作计划，及时开展导游IC卡联网检查，并按时传送检查信息。“十一”前后，国家旅游局将抽查各地开展导游IC卡检查工作的情况。
（三）加快改革步伐，完善旅游企业经营体制和内部管理机制。要深入研究“非典”对旅游活动深层次的影响，特别是由此而暴露出的旅游企业经营体制和内部管理机制不健全、抵抗风险能力差等问题。要鼓励在市场导向下的企业重组，实现旅游企业经营、投资和产权的多元化、网络化和企业内部经营管理的科学化，向做大做强发展。要积极引进国际上有信誉、有实力的旅行社来华建立控股或独资旅行社。要积极探索建立更加完整的旅游保险体系，为企业发展和规避风险创造有利条件。
请各省区市旅游局按照本《通知》的精神，紧密结合本地实际，认真抓好贯彻落实工作，为全国夺取抗击“非典”的最后胜利和为各地区旅游业的尽快恢复发展做出更大贡献。
特此通知。
国家旅游局
二○○三年六月十八日
